Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

State of Utah v. Lonnie Kirkland Masciantonio :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Kris Leonard; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Gary W. Pendleton; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Masciantonio, No. 920466 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3430

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

Case No. 920466-CA

:
Priority No. 2

LONNIE KIRKLAND MASCIANTONIO, :
Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF FORGERY, A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-6-501 (1990), IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JAMES L.
SHUMATE, PRESIDING.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BR'.E?

UTAH
DOOU:-.T^T

KFU
DOCKET NO. — /

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
KRIS LEONARD (4902)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Appellee

GARY W. PENDLETON (2564)
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-4411
Attorney for Appellant

Cte,
UtahCc •

.

drf

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

Case No. 920466-CA

:
Priority No. 2

LONNIE KIRKLAND MASCIANTONIO, :
Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF FORGERY, A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-6-501 (1990), IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JAMES L.
SHUMATE, PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
KRIS LEONARD (4902)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Appellee

GARY W. PENDLETON (2564)
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-4411
Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS
OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I

POINT II

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6501(3)(B) (1990) IS APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANT'S
CONDUCT

6

THE DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF § 766-501 MAY BE UPHELD UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE
OF THE STATUTE, NEGATING REVIEW OF ANY
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

13

POINT III THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND S 76-6-501 IS
CLEAR FROM THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE
OF THE STATUTE, OBVIATING THE NEED FOR A
REVIEW OF THE STATUTE'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
TO INTERPRET ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE

14

CONCLUSION.

16

ADDENDA

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 793 P.2d 362
(Utah 1990)

8

North Carolina v. Alford. 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct.
160 (1970)

4

People v. Korsen, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 380 (1983)

8

State v. Allegra. 129 N.H. 720, 533 A.2d 338
(N.H. 1987)

8, 9

State v. Brvan. 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985)

15

State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1989)

15

State v. Jaimez. 817 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 1991)

1, 7, 13

State v. Jones. 735 P.2d 399 (Utah App. 1987)

7, 13

State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989)

11

State v. Serpente. 768 P.2d 994 (Ut. App. 1989)

7

State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988)

4

State v. Shondel. 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146
(1969)
State v. Singh. 819 P.2d 356 (Utah App.), cert.
denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992)

6, 13, 15, 16
1, 7, 8, 10, 13

State v. Stromberg. 783 P.2d 54 (Utah App. 1989)

16

State v. Vogt. 824 P.2d 455 (Utah App. 1991)

15

Village Inn Apartments, v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1990)

8

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412 (1990)

14

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501 (1990)

1, 2, 3, 6, 8,
10, 13-15

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1992)

1
ii

OTHER AUTHORITIES
WAYNE R. LAFAFVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW § 8.7 (1986)

iii

11

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

Case No. 920466-CA

I
Priority No. 2

LONNIE KIRKLAND MASCIANTONIO, :
Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered
upon a no contest plea to the charge of forgery, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to
quash the information based on its interpretation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-6-501 (1990).

This Court reviews a trial court's

statutory determination for correctness, according it no
particular deference.

State v. Sinah, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah

App.), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992); State v. Jaimez,
817 P.2d 822, 826 (Utah App. 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501 (1990):
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose
to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another
without his authority or utters any such
altered writing; or
(b) Hakes, completes, executes,
authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes,
or utters any writing so that the writing or
the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference,
publication or utterance purports to be the
act of another, whether the person is
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have
been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the
case, or to be a copy of an original when no
such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes
printing or any other method of recording information,
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value,
right, privilege, or identification•
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if
the writing is or purports to be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any
other instrument or writing issued by a
government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) A check with a face amount of $100
or more, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any
other instrument or writing representing an
interest in or claim against property, or a
pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if
the writing is or purports to be a check with a face
amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class
A misdemeanor•
The text of any other relevant constitutional,
statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of the
issue presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Lonnie Kirkland Masciantonio, was charged
with forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann, § 76-6-501 (1990) (R. I). 1 During the preliminary hearing,
defendant presented a verbal motion to quash the information
supported by a written memorandum, urging that the charged
offense constituted a class A misdemeanor, not a second degree
felony (R. 30). The court denied the motion, specifically
finding that the offense was properly charged as a second degree
felony because the written instrument represented Ma pecuniary
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise" pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) (R. 20; Addendum A attached
hereto).

The court then bound the matter over to the district

court (R. 30, 33-34).
Defendant renewed her motion to quash in the district
court, filing a formal motion supported by two written memoranda
(R. 35, 36-37, 38-41, 42-51).2

The district judge took judicial

notice of the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, over
which he had presided (R. 53, 64; Arraignment Transcript
[hereinafter Arr.] at 5), and explained his "clear recollection

1

Defendant was married during the proceedings below, and the
record was amended by interlineation to reflect her new name of
Lonnie Kirkland Nielson (R. 20, 66).
2

In the district court, defendant sought to have the
information quashed absent the prosecutor's willingness to amend it
to reflect a class A misdemeanor (R. 36). For consistency, this
brief reflects the "motion to quash" terminology used below,
although the State recognizes that the motion is more properly
characterized as a motion to dismiss.
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of the testimony offered by the State of Utah at the preliminary
hearing" (Arr. at 5; Addendum B attached hereto)*

He then denied

the motion, reiterating that the forged document represented Ma
pecuniary interest in or claim against the enterprisfe in]
question here, which happened to be the St. George Radio Shack"
(R. 53; Arr. 5-6).
Defendant thereafter entered a no contest plea
conditioned on her right to appeal the district court's ruling on
her motion in accordance with State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah
App. 1988), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct.
160 (1970) (R. 53, 54-60, 68; Arr. 17-18).

The court accepted

the plea (Arr. 18), stayed imposition of the sentence, and placed
defendant on probation for 36 months (R. 66-67, 69-71).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Between June 1990 and April 1991, defendant was
employed as assistant manager at Radio Shack in St. George, Utah
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript [hereinafter Prelim.] at 3-4).
On April 4, 1991, Radio Shack's owner, Al Coif, discovered an
invoice which reflected that defendant had put some speakers on
layaway and had made a partial payment of $70.22 to the store's
manager on April 2, 1991 (Prelim, at 13, 25-27; see Addendum C
for copies of all relevant invoices).

A second invoice reflected

a second payment of $202.00, representing the balance owed on the
speakers, allegedly made to the same manager on April 6, 1991, at
6:28 p.m. (Prelim, at 13-14, 27-28; Addendum C).

Coif also

discovered a third invoice which had been written seven minutes
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before the second invoice (Prelim, at 10, 12, 14), and which
appeared to reflect the signature of a customer, Leslie Church.
It reflected that Church had returned to the same store manager
two pieces of merchandise and had received a cash refund of
$227.79 (Prelim, at 10, 12, 14, 17; Addendum C).

The manager in

question was not working during any of the times indicated on the
three invoices (Prelim, at 9-10, 15, 28-29, 30), and he denied
receiving either of defendant's two payments or handling the
Church transaction (Prelim, at 27). Defendant was working during
the periods reflected on all the invoices (Prelim, at 10, 15).
None of the invoices had been processed pursuant to standard
company policy (Prelim, at 7-8), an original sales slip could not
be found (Prelim, at 20), and the returned merchandise was
missing (Prelim, at 8, 9, 17, 25). The store contacted Leslie
Church who denied returning any merchandise to the store (Prelim,
at 12, 31-32).

The State charged defendant with forgery of the

Church receipt, contending that she forged and submitted the
receipt to Radio Shack to conceal her theft of cash or
merchandise from the company (R. 62)•
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court properly found that the forged
invoice represented Ma pecuniary interest in or claim against"
Radio Shack, thereby establishing the gradation of the offense.
The language of § 76-6-501 is clear and unambiguous on its face
and plainly proscribes defendant's conduct as a second degree
felony.

Consequently, the doctrine of eiusdem generis does not

5

apply, and the statute should be interpreted pursuant to its
plain language without the need to look at its legislative
history.
The Shondel doctrine does not apply because § 76-6-501
is clear and unambiguous in its application to defendant's
offense.

Further, the statute does not impose different

penalties for identical conduct-

Hence, defendant is not

entitled to the lesser grade of offense.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6501(3)(B) (1990) IS APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANT'S
CONDUCT
In denying defendant's motion to quash, the district
court held that the offense constituted a second degree felony
because the invoice was an "instrument or writing representing
. . a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or
enterprise" as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(3)(b)
(1990) (R. 53; Arr. 5-6; Addenda A & B).

Defendant argues that

the phrasing of subsection (3)(b) necessarily limits the "other
instrument or writing" to those documents of similar character as
issues of corporate stock certificates or bonds (Br. of App. at
5).

She contends that because the writing at issue is not of

this character, she was entitled to have the charge against her
reduced to a class A misdemeanor.

This limited interpretation is

without merit where the language of the statute is clear on its
face and was properly applied by the district court.
6

This Court reviews a trial court's statutory
interpretation for correctness.

State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356,

359 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992); State v.
Jaimez. 817 P.2d 822, 826 (Utah App. 1991).

The primary

responsibility in statutory construction is "to give effect to
the intent of the legislature."

Singh, 819 P.2d at 359 (quoting

State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987)).

"Where

statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will not look
further to divine legislative intent, but will construe the
statute according to its plain language."

Singh, 819 P.2d 356,

358; Jaime2, 817 P.2d at 826; Jones, 735 P.2d at 402.
Defendant's interpretation is based on her application
of the doctrine of elusdem generis.

That doctrine provides that

"'where general words follow the enumeration of particular
classes of things, the general words will be construed as
applying only to things of the same general class as those
enumerated.'"

State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 997 (Ut. App.

1989) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 464 (5th ed. 1979)).
doctrine only applies when
(1) the statute contains an enumeration by
specific words; (2) the members of the
enumeration suggest a class; (3) the class is
not exhausted by the enumeration; (4) a
general reference supplementing the
enumeration, usually following it; and (5)
there is not clearly manifested an intent
that the general term be given a broader
meaning than the doctrine requires. It is
generally held that the rule of elusdem
generis is merely a rule of construction and
is only applicable where legislative intent
or language expressing that intent is
unclear.
7

The

NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.18 (5th
ed. 1992).

The Utah Supreme Court has voiced agreement with this

analysis, holding that the doctrine does not apply absent
ambiguity.

Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 367

(Utah 1990); Village Inn Apartments, v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 790 P.2d 581, 538-84 & n.2 (Utah App. 1990); see,
e.g., Singh, 819 P.2d at 359.

Because there is no ambiguity in

the statutory language defendant challenges, the doctrine does
not apply in this case.
Subsection (3)(b) specifically enumerates 3 types of
instruments:

a check for $100 or more, an issue of stocks, and

an issue of bonds (see supra at 2 for complete text of statute).
Defendant's argument ignores the significance of the
legislature's intentional inclusion of a check and focuses only
on the stocks and bonds language.

However, it is essential to

consider all of the language to determine the relevant
legislative intent.

As defendant points out, a check is not of

the same character document as stocks or bonds (Br. of App. at 67).

See People v. Korsen, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 380, 381-82 (1983) (bank

checks are not to be included within a listing of "corporate
stock certificates, bonds and the likeM).

However, all three

instruments contain a common element which is identified in the
remainder of the subsection:

they all represent "an interest in

or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim
against any person or enterprise."

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-

501(3)(b); see State v. Allegra, 129 N.H. 720, 533 A.2d 338, 341-
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42 (N.H. 1987) (attributing the common characteristic noted in
the statute to all three of the specifically listed documents).
The statute then includes, without an exhaustive listing, all
other instruments which possess the same common element.

The

language clearly indicates that the "other instruments" need only
possess the single common characteristic.

See Alleara, 533 A.2d

at 342 (finding that a document does not fall within the
described grade of offense where it is not one of the three
documents specifically listed and does not represent the interest
or claim identified in the statute and common in the listed
documents).
As the district court found, the writing at issue in
this case meets this requirement.

In the normal course of

business, a customer's signature on a properly drafted invoice
for returned merchandise represents a claim against Radio Shack
for the purchase price of the merchandise which has been
returned.

When the signed invoice is returned to the store

employee, the purchase price is given to the customer in
satisfaction of the claim or, if store funds are insufficient,
the customer is sent to another location where, upon
presentation, the invoice is paid (Prelim, at 6, 22-23).
Consequently, an invoice for the return of merchandise
represents, however briefly, the customer's pecuniary claim
against the business.

The forged invoice in this instance

purports to represent such an interest and, hence, comes within

9

the type of instrument whose forgery is intended by the statute
to be punished as a second degree felony.
Defendant contends that the invoice is not the type of
instrument required by subsection (3)(b) because, unlike stocks
and bonds, it was not and could not have been used or negotiated
against Radio Shack, apparently because no money was actually
paid by Radio Shack in exchange for the invoice (Br. of App. at
7).

This argument fails for two reasons.

First, the requirement

of negotiability stems from defendant's contention that the
instrument must be "similar to issues of corporate stock
certificates or bonds" (Br. of App. at 5), which argument ignores
the plain language of the statute as discussed above.

The

statute does not require that the forged writing be negotiable;
merely that it be a "symbol[] of value, right, privilege, or
identification."

Utah Code Ann- § 76-6-501(2); c£. Singh, 819

P.2d at 359 (nothing in the statute "suggests that the
legislature intended that an instrument be legally effective or
complete").

Second, the instrument need not actually represent

the interest identified in subsection (3)(b).

It is sufficient

if the writing "purports to be" an instrument representing the
identified interests.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(3).

The invoice

in this case not only purports to represent a claim by Church
against Radio Shack for a refund of $227.79, but purports to
represent Radio Shack's payment of the claim as evidenced by the
company's refund policy and the presence of the invoice in the
company's records.

Even assuming, as defendant claims, that it
10

factually represents only "an effort to conceal a theft through
fabrication of a writing" (Br. of App. at 7), the district court
could properly focus on what the invoice, on its face, purports
to represent.
Defendant further distinguishes the invoice from the
enumeration in subsection (3)(b) as representing the
extinguishment of a claim (Br. of App. at 7). This argument
appears to require that the forged instrument represent an
outstanding interest or claim before it may give rise to a second
degree felony charge.

This argument is untenable as it would

undermine the legislature's intent to punish forgeries of equal
magnitude as second degree felonies.

The statute's language

reflects the legislature's exercise of its prerogative to define
the elements and degree of punishment for the crime of forgery.
See State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 504-05 (Utah 1989).
Defendant's argument would require that any forged writing
constituting a second degree offense which was negotiated or
otherwise paid prior to prosecution would be punished as a class
A misdemeanor.

This is clearly contrary to both the statutory

language and any realistic interpretation of the legislative
intent behind the statute.
"Forgery is a crime aimed primarily at safeguarding
confidence in the genuiness of documents relied upon in
commercial and business activity."

WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.

SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW S 8.7(5) (1986).

The forged

document fits within this primary concern as it was routinely

11

relied upon by the victim business in conducting its daily
business activity.

The form used to facilitate the forgery was

the standard invoice form used by Radio Shack in all its sale and
refund transactions.

The invoices were used to maintain and

update customer mailing lists (Prelim, at 11), to maintain
accurate inventory counts (Prelim, at 21), to review individual
salesman activity, and for other management purposes (Prelim, at
19).

Although the charged offense represents a single

transaction of $227.79, the fact that this method of forgery
could easily be conducted on a larger-scale is demonstrated both
by the owner's concern for several invoices representing returns
for which refunds had been given but no corresponding returned
merchandise could be found (Prelim, at 8, 16, 30) and by the fact
that the forgery occurred on a document which was readily
available in an apparently unlimited supply to all store salesmen
(Prelim, at 4, 6-7, 11). The number of forged invoices and the
amount of each is limited only by the forger and the company's
ability to screen for such forgeries.
Because the commercial invoice at issue in this case
purports to represent a claim against and honored by Radio Shack,
it satisfies the common condition required by the plain language
of subsection (3)(b), and the offense constitutes a second degree
forgery.

Hence, the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in denying defendant's motion to quash the
information.
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POINT II
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND § 76-6-501 IS
CLEAR FROM THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE
OF THE STATUTE, OBVIATING THE NEED FOR A
REVIEW OF THE STATUTE'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
TO INTERPRET ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE
In an argument closely related to her first point,
defendant appears to contend that her conduct was not the type of
large-scale forgery intended to be addressed by § 76-6-501(3),
and that her small-scale forgery is adequately addressed by the
theft statute; thus, because the alleged theft would be
punishable as a class A misdemeanor, the forgery allegedly
committed to conceal the theft should be punished as the same
degree of offense (Br. of App. at 10).3
As previously established, the language of § 76-6501(3)(b) is clear and unambiguous on its face.

(See Point I.)

Accordingly, this Court should construe the statute according to
its plain language and not address the "legislative history"
argument suggested by defendant.

Singh, 819 P.2d at 358; Jaimez,

817 P.2d at 826; Jones, 735 P.2d at 402.
Defendant also argues that the State in fact seeks only
to punish the taking of $227.79 from Radio Shack and that the
theft statute provides the appropriate punishment for a taking of

3

Defendant does not argue that the forgery and theft statutes
both apply to prohibit the conduct with which she is charged,
thereby entitling her to application of the theft statute pursuant
to State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 346, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (1969).
She simply equates the punishments for theft and forgery and
contends that, based upon the amount of her forgery, she is
entitled to the same punishment she would have received for theft
of an equal value.

13

this amount (Br. of App. at 10, citing to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6412(1)(c) (1990)/ providing that theft of property valued between
$100 and $250 is a class A misdemeanor).

The State charged and

prosecuted defendant for forgery, not theft (R. 1). The fact
that defendant may have committed the forgery to conceal the
theft and may have realized no additional monetary benefit from
the forgery does not require that she be punished solely on the
basis of the theft.

Further, the amount of the theft cannot be

determined from the record on appeal/ which contains only part of
the three-day preliminary hearing below.

Although the record

suggests that defendant may have taken cash or merchandise in
excess of $227.79/ the amount of the theft is not relevant to her
prosecution for forgery.

The suggestion that the legislature

intended to correlate theft and forgery is further undermined
where the forgery statute clearly provides that forgery of a
check for less than $100 constitutes a third degree felony (Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-501(4))/ while theft of property valued at less
than $100 constitutes a class B misdemeanor (Utah Code Ann. § 766-412(l)(d) (1990).
POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED FOR A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY IN LIGHT OF THE CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF § 76-6-501
Defendant argues that because Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
is not clear and specific concerning whether her forgery
constitutes a second degree felony under subsection (3)(b) or a
class A misdemeanor under subsection (4), she is entitled to be

14

convicted of and sentenced for the class A misdemeanor pursuant
to State v, Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 346, 453 P.2d 146, 148
(1969).

Shondel dealt with a situation where possession of LSD

was punishable by two different statutes, one proscribing the
conduct as a misdemeanor and the other as a felony.

The Utah

Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing to the lesser
penalty.

Defendant relies upon the statement in Shondel that

"where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two
punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to
the benefit of the lesser."

Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148.

Subsequent case law from the Utah Supreme Court and this Court
has clarified the holding in Shondel as providing "that if two
statutes are wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime,
the law does not permit a prosecutor to exercise the wholly
unfettered authority to decide whether the crime should be
charged as a misdemeanor or a felony."

State v. Brvan, 709 P.2d

257, 263 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Voqt, 824 P.2d 455, 457
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App.
1989) (quoting Brvan, 709 P.2d at 263) ("The application of
Shondel is limited to situations where the statutes at issue are
'wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime. . . . ' " ) .
As previously discussed, § 76-6-501 is clear and
unambiguous in its application to defendant's offense.
Point I.)

(See

Accordingly, Shondel does not apply, and defendant's

argument must fail.

15

Further, the forgery statute does not impose different
penalties for identical conduct where, by the express terms of
the statute, conduct that constitutes a second degree felony
pursuant to subsection (3) cannot also constitute a class A
misdemeanor pursuant to subsection (4). Hence, Shondel does not
entitle defendant to the lesser grade of offense.

See State v.

Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 61 (Utah App. 1989).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and
sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 3 / a a y of October, 1992,

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Gary
W. Pendleton, attorney for appellant, 150 North 200 East, Suite
202, St. George, Utah 84770, this
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]
]}

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
RE: GRADATION OF OFFENSE

vs.
]I

LONNIE KIRKLAND MASCIANTONIO,
Defendant

Case No. 911001904
(James L. Shumate)

]

The above-entitled matter came on for Preliminary Hearing on January 24,1992,
at which time the Court heard testimony from Richard L. Wright, questioned document
examiner. The matter was thereafter continued in order to afford the State opportunity to
conduct further investigation ofthe case and examination of other questioned documents. The
matter came on again for Preliminary Hearing on April 30, 1992, during which hearing
testimony from Richard L. Wright was concluded and the matter was again continued until on
May 1,1992. The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses and having received into
evidence certain documents, the Court concluded that the Defendant should be bound over for

1

trial on the charge of Forgery, a Second Degree Felony. In so concluding the Court made the
following specific:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The alleged forgery is a document which was received as State's Exhibit No.
1, said document purporting to be a receipt signed by one Leslie Church purporting to
acknowledge the payment of the sum of $227.79.
2. The Court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the Defendant
made and executed the receipt for the purpose ofconcealing the theft of cash and/or value from
Radio Shack.
3. The Court specifically finds that the alleged forgery does not represent a
"security, revenue stamp, or other instrument or writing issued by a government, or agency
thereof as set forth in U.C.A. 76-6-501(3)(a).
4. The court further specifically finds that the alleged forgery does not represent
"a check with the face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stock, bond, or other instrument
or writing purporting to represent an interest in or claim against any property" as those terms
are defined in U.C.A. 76-6-501(3)(b).
5. However, the Court finds that the alleged forgery does purport to represent
"a pecuniary interest in or claim against a n y . . . enterprise": to wit: Coifs Plumbing, dba
Radio Shack.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court make the following:

2

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The alleged forgery purports to represent "a pecuniary interest in or claim
against [an] enterprise" and therefore constitutes a second degree felony.
2. There is probable cause to believe that the Defendant made and/or executed
said document with a purpose to defraud another, to-wit for the purpose of concealing
shortages in the Radio Shack till which would have otherwisejbfien^apparent.

3

ADDENDUM B

1

Court to do two things:

I —

in the context of the way

2

proceedings are now handled in this district, this was the

3

Court that handled the preliminary hearing, and I would ask

4

the Court to first of all, if the Court finds the findings

5

and conclusions that I have prepared for the Court's

6

execution in connection with the bindover order as being

7

findings of fact that the Court did make and conclusions of

B

law that the Court did reach in connection with that

9 I decision, to bind my client over to the District Court for
ID

trial.

11

and conclusions and make them a part of this record.

12

And I would ask the Court to execute those findings

I would also ask the Court, since this Court was the

13

committing magistrate and since the proceedings are —

14

preliminary hearing proceedings were in the same court, I

15

would ask the Court to take judicial notice of those

16

proceedings in ruling on the motion to quash.

17

the

And the

I reason I ask the Court to do that is that in the event where

18

there is an appeal taken and in the event that we feel some

19

need to supplement that record on appeal, I would like the

20

ability or the availability of the preliminary hearing

21

proceedings on the appeal to the extent that there's some

22

issue that maybe is not addressed in the findings and

23

conclusions, but is pivotal to the decision on appeal.

24
25

THE COURT:

Because the only evidence before the

Court in the form of the sworn testimony is the preliminary
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
C E R T I F I E D S H O R T H A N D REPORTER

<*01)«73-S100

hearing transcript?
MR. PENDLETON:

That's right.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Langston, I don't see a
problem in following that course.

Do you have any

difficulty with that?
MR. LANGSTON:

No, I don't have any problem with

that.
THE COURT:

Let me quickly review the findings and

conclusions regarding gradation of offense.
I think those findings specifically outline my findings
at the preliminary hearing, so I will execute findings of
fact and conclusions of law with respect to the findings at
the preliminary hearing.
Now, with respect with your motion to quash, Mr.
Pendleton, the Court specifically takes judicial notice of
the preliminary hearing as the District Judge in the Fifth
District.
matter.

I sat as the committing magistrate in this

I have a clear recollection of the testimony

offered by the State of Utah at the preliminary hearing in
this matter, and based upon that testimony at the
preliminary hearing, which is the evidentiary basis for the
Court's decision on the motion to quash, the Court having
specifically found its findings of fact with respect to that
issue, I again reiterate in respect to the motion to quash
that the forgery, which is the subject of this matter and
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
C E R T I F I E D S H O R T H A N D REPORTER

C

the prior focus at the preliminary hearing, the purported
receipt alleged to have been signed by one Leslie Church/
acknowledging the payment of $227.79 was not a security,
revenue, stamp or other instrument in writing issued by the
government or agency thereof.

It was not a check with a

face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stock, bond or
other instrument or writing purporting to represent an
interest or claim against any property.

I do# however, find

that that particular receipt allegedly signed Leslie Church
was a document which represented a pecuniary interest in or
claim against the enterprising question here, which happened
to be the St. George Radio Shack, which is a dba for Coif's
Plumbing.
And with that finding, your motion to quash is denied
based specifically upon the testimony at the preliminary
hearing.
I think that concludes your record adequately, counsel?
MR. PENDLETON:

It does with one —

does the Court

have my statement of points and authorities in the file?
THE COURT:

Your statement of points and

authorities is here in the file (inaudible, microphone not
working.)
MR. PENDLETON:

Okay.

I think that makes my

record.
It is our intent to enter into an agreement with the
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
C E R T I F I E D S H O R T H A N D REPORTER
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ADDENDUM C
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FRANCHISE/DEALER STORE

STORE OWNED AND OPERATED BY
COLFS PT.UMBTNG TNC R/S 1H.R .
781 SOUTH BT.UFF STREET
ST GEORGE UT 84770
PHONE 801-628-4241
/

INVOICE NO.

\

*** NO CASH REFUNDS AFTER 5 DAYS ***
SOLD TO

f?:STOMFR # 3320
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All merchandise returned for credit, refund or exchange must be in new and re-saleable
condition in original cartons with original packing, accessories, guarantees and instructions,
and must be accompanied by this sales slip Non-Radio Shack merchandise for exchange
or refund can only be returned to this store The above store is an independently owned
dealer/franchise. Policies regarding refunds and exchanges are determined by the owner.
Radio Shack warranties are limited to the written limited warranty which accompanies
merchandise manufactured by or for the Radio Shack Division of Tandy Corporation

•

,ft

1 D»HPRi^:0ft
127.46

^MyAifW«t
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SUBTOTAL
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CASH
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1
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A l l merchandise returned for creo)t, refundor exchange mutt be in new and resaleable
condition »n original cartons with original packing accessories, guarantees and instructions.
»r\d must be accompanied by this sales slip Non Radio Shack merchandise for exchange
-or refund can only be returned to this store The above store is an independently owned
dealer/franchise Policies regarding refunds and exchanges ere determined by the owner.
Radio Shack warranties are limited to the written limited warranty which accompanies
merchandise manufactured by or for the Radio Shack Division of Tfcndy Corporation
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T
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AH merchandise returnecNoy credit, refund or exchange must be in new and re-saleable
condition in original cartons with original packi)jjQccessories, guarantees and instructions,
and must b * accompanied by this sales slip tforHRadio Shack merchandise for exchange
or refund can only be returned to this jtore The above store is an independently owned
dealer/franchise Policies regarding refunds vri exchanges are determined by the owner
Radio Shack warranties are lirjnited to the written limited warranty which accompanies
merchandise manufacture^ bvor<4or the RadioJShack Division of Tandy Corporation
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